INTRODUCTION
When Edward Palmer (E.P.) Thompson died in 1993 at the age of 69, he was hailed as the greatest historian in the English-speaking world.' While other historians focused on the dominant figures and major events of history, Thompson Travail 11, at 14. Thompson was also the world's most often cited twentieth-century historian, and among the 250 most frequently cited authors of all time. E. Hobsbawm, 'E.P. Thompson' (1994) 58 Radical History Rev. 157, at 157.
suffered through the epochal upheavals of the Industrial Revolution. 2 In dignifying them with respect and sympathy, Thompson displayed an uncommon understanding of the human condition.
Thompson also displayed a great appreciation for law as a social institution, especially for a (self-described) 'historian in the Marxist tradition'. He found 'the rhetoric of eighteenth-century England ... saturated with the notion of law': 3 The law did not keep politely to a 'level' but was at every bloody level; it was imbricated within the mode of production and productive relations themselves (as property-rights, definitions of agrarian practice) and it was simultaneously present in the philosophy of Locke; it intruded brusquely within alien categories, reappearing bewigged and gowned in the guise of ideology; it danced a cotillion with religion, moralising over the theatre of Tyburn; it was an arm of politics and politics was one of its arms; it was an academic discipline, subjected to the rigour of its own autonomous logic; it contributed to the definition of the self-identity both of rulers and of ruled; above all, it afforded an arena for class struggle, within which alternative notions of law were fought out. 4 Thompson's identification of law as the locus of political contention led his student and colleague, Peter Linebaugh, to write that Thompson's central message to his readers was 'Go to Law School '. 5 This essay examines the function of law in Thompson' s historical works in light of his conception of the Rule of Law, which he articulated as an inchoate afterthought in Whigs and Hunters (1975) . I will argue that Thompson's reverence for the Rule of Law was in no way inconsistent with his derision of the unjust legal rules and procedures that curtailed the legal and constitutional rights of 'freeborn Englishmen' in the eighteenth century. I will review and respond to criticisms of his espousal of the Rule of Law. And I will suggest that Thompson's conception of the Rule of Law (although or, perhaps, because he left it incompletely theorized) points the way toward a possible reconciliation of liberal and radical approaches to law. The statute's title referred to the blackened faces the rebels wore in disguise.
Enclosure, which had been an ongoing process since the fifteenth century, converted common lands to private/individual ownership, and in doing so turned many users of the commons into trespassers. Economic historians typically cite the enclosure movement in England as a prime example of an institutional change that makes possible higher levels of economic growth and resource conservation because of the greater incentives to production and conservation provided by private (by which they mean individual) ownership of land. 8 But their analyses typically neglect the legal effects of enclosure. When 6 See R. Fine, 'The Rule of Law and Muggletonian Marxism: The Perplexities of Edward Thompson' (1994) 21 J of Law and Society 193, at 208 ('in all its manifestations, Thompson's attitude to law was critical'). 7 The Black Act is reprinted in Thompson, op. cit., n. 3, at appendix I, pp. 270-7.
Thompson more clearly asserts in a later work, Customs and Commons, that hunters and foragers believed their historical uses, 'practised "time out of mind",' were in fact 'rights'. E.P. Thompson Parliament turned the commons into private, individually-owned property, it did not create property rights where none had existed before; rather, enclosure redistributed existing property rights. As Thompson explained:
What was often at issue was not property, supported by law, against noproperty; it was alternative definitions of property-rights: for the landowner, enclosure; for the cottager, common rights; for the forest officialdom, 'preserved grounds' for the deer; for the foresters, the fight to take turfs. For as long as it remained possible, the ruled -if they could find a purse and a lawyer -would actually fight for their rights by means of law; occasionally the copyholders, resting upon the precedents of sixteenth-century law, could actually win a case. When it ceased to be possible to continue the fight at law, men still felt a sense of legal wrong: the propertied had obtained their power by illegitimate means.
9
The enclosure laws took away property rights -specifically, common-use rights -from those who traditionally had foraged and grazed their animals on the commons, and gave those rights to other, politically powerful individuals who already possessed a great deal of property. This is the story of the enclosure acts Thompson relates in Whigs and Hunters. The law and lawyers were at the center of Thompson's story. Under the influence of liberal theorists, such as Adam Smith and John Locke, England's common law lawyers of the eighteenth century became 'converted to the notions of absolute property ownership' in preference to 'the messy complexities of coincident use-ight'.1° The enclosure movement generally, and the Black Act in particular, reflected this conversion, and 'represented the culmination of a social and economic struggle through which a "customary" economy of forest-dwellers was destroyed and replaced by a market-oriented regime based on 'capitalist property rights'.
1 Those whose rights were extinguished received, at best, 'perfunctory compensation'. 12 For the most part, their rights were simply converted into crimes, some of which were punishable by death. When they protested against these usurpations, the dispossessed were not viewed as rights-holders defending their property but were branded as criminals interfering with the property of others. For Thompson, however, they were defenders of the traditional legal and constitutional rights of freeborn Englishmen against unjust expropriation without compensation. 13 Thompson's argument, although highly critical of legal injustice, was, thus, decidedly legalistic. The Black Act was for Thompson 'a bad law, drawn by bad legislators, and enlarged by the interpretations of bad judges'. 14 It was an instrument of class power pure and simple that could not be reconciled in any way with 'natural justice'.' 5 That did not lead Thompson to conclude, however, that all laws inevitably are instruments of injustice.
THOMPSON'S EPIPHANY: THE RULE OF LAW AS 'AN
UNQUALIFIED HUMAN GOOD'
Thompson's defence of the Rule of Law
The first 258 pages of Whigs and Hunters could have led Thompson to a conventional Marxian conclusion that law is an instrument of brute force by which the ruling class consolidates and reinforces its hegemony. To the extent the hunters in Thompson's story thought themselves protected by the ancestral/mythical 'rights of freeborn Englishmen', they were deluded: the law branded them criminals and sentenced them to death for exercising their supposed 'rights'. Indeed, Thompson concludes that the Black Act constituted a form of state-sponsored 'Terror'.' 6 Thompson might have ended his book on that note, but did not. 17 Instead, he added an afterword, 18 a seemingly incongruous essay not about the legal and political conflicts over forest lands but about the implications of his study for the law and its analysis by historians. It is entitled, 'The Rule of Law', and its eleven pages comprise one of the greatest defences ever mounted of that concept (and one of the very few penned by a self-described Marxist).
9
Having exposed the inequities of the Black Act and the enclosure movement, Thompson proceeds to caution his readers not to infer from his analysis that the Rule of Law is only a mask for the rule of a class. Law surely is an instrument of class power, but that is not all it is. In writing this, Thompson repudiates the typical 'Marxist-structural critique', according to which the law has no independent existence, but is wholly determined by social relations, which themselves are determined by the economic base of social relations. 20 Thompson denies this. To be sure, he writes, the law is ideological. In the eighteenth century the law became 'a superb instrument by which the ... rulers were able to impose new definitions of property to 14 id., p. 267. 15 id. 16 id., p. 258. 17 id.
their even greater advantage, as in the extinction by law of indefinite agrarian use-rights and in the furtherance of enclosure'. 2 1 But, Thompson insists, the law is not just ideology; it has (and must have) its 'own logic, rules and procedures':
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic and criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually being just.
22
If the law did not matter -were it only the expression of pure powerThompson notes, there would be no point in writing a book about the Black Act or the enclosure laws. 23 Moreover, it is the law's partial autonomy from the pure politics of power that renders rulers (unwittingly) 'prisoners of their own rhetoric'. 24 They themselves must not be seen constantly flounting the law or else the general public will not accept and respect law as a legitimate social institution. 2 5 To this point, Thompson's approach to the Rule of Law is defensive and at the margins: the law is not just ideology; not only an instrument of class power; not wholly determined by the economic base of society. But Thompson is not content to deny the kind of universal absolute that historians by their nature and training are inclined to debunk. He counters with his own universal absolute: 'the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good '.26 This assertion of the intrinsic virtue of the Rule of Law, far more I suspect than his denunciations of simplistic Marxist dogmas, stunned Thompson This story fits the troubled frame of mind Thompson exhibited in the first pages of the final section of that book:
I sit here in my study, at the age of fifty, the desk and the floor piled high with five years of notes, xeroxes, rejected drafts, the clock once again moving into the small hours, and see myself, in a lucid instant, as an anachronism. Why have I spent these years trying to find out what could, in its essential structures, have been known without any investigation at all? And does it matter a damn who gave Parson Power his instructions; which forms brought 'Vulcan' Gates to the gallows; or how an obscure Richmond publican managed to evade a death sentence already determined upon by the Law Officers, the First Minister and the King? 34 If law is nothing more than an instrument of power, none of Thompson's history mattered a damn. But, Thompson concluded, his history did matter because the law matters. 35 Beyond his wife's influence, Thompson's entire career, in important respects, reflected a commitment to the Rule of Law. His references in the last section of Whigs and Hunters to the Third Reich and the kulaks were not merely academic; they were reminders of political stakes for which he himself had fought during his life. In particular, his experience of Soviet repression and aggression, which led him to resign his Communist Party membership in 1956, may have taught Thompson to distinguish between governments constrained by legal accountability from those that are not.
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And when he fought to outlaw nuclear weapons from the late 1950s into the 1970s, 37 Thompson certainly treated law as if it mattered.
Thompson's minimal conception of the Rule of Law
Whatever the source(s) of Thompson In Whigs and Hunters, Thompson appears to adopt a minimal conception of the Rule of Law, defining it as little (or nothing) more than a rule of equal application of the legal rules, which limits ruling power. Whatever the content of the legal rules, they must apply equally to the powerful and powerless, to the rich and poor. 38 The legal rules themselves may be just or unjust, adopted according to democratic or anti-democratic processes, but so long as the law actually constrains state power, then the state may be said to comport with the Rule of Law.
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This minimal Rule of Law is distinguished from other, more elaborate conceptions, which entail additional conditions. Many (perhaps most) versions of the Rule of Law require not only equal application of the laws but certain legal processes to ensure that legal rules are promulgated and known prior to their application. 40 Some versions assert that an independent judiciary is 'essential for the preservation of the rule of law' .
4 1 Still others claim that Rule of Law requires society as a whole, including its rulers, to possess 'a strong sense of commitment to public virtue' .42 Finally, in some versions the Rule of Law requires the fulfillment of substantive ('moral') rights.
43
That Thompson subscribed to a minimal conception of the rule of lawrequiring nothing more than equal application of the laws -rather than some more elaborate conception, is evident from certain of his statements, and the context in which he expressed them, in Whigs and Hunters. First and foremost, Thompson stresses only the value of the of the Rule of Law for limiting government: the rulers imprisoned themselves with their rhetoric of law and the legal rights of free-born Englishmen. 44 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the law became a bulwark against the return of 'royal prerogative, or the presumption of the aristocracy' because 'the law, in its forms and traditions, entailed principles of equity and universality which, perforce, had to be extended to all sorts and degrees of men' . 45 Consequently, the law and its forms 'imposed, again and again, inhibitions upon the actions of the rulers'.46 Thus, while law may 'mystify the powerless' and 'disguise the true realities of power', it also 'may modify, in profound ways the behavior of the powerful' and curbing their power and checking their intrusions.
4 7 Thompson takes from this the 'obvious point, which some modern Marxists have overlooked, that there is a difference between arbitrary power and the rule of law' 48 As set forth in Whigs and Hunters, Thompson's conception of the Rule of Law is concerned exclusively with limiting power by equal application of the legal rules; it imposes no particular requirements on legal process or the content of legal rules. Indeed, Thompson remains throughout quite suspicious of legal rules, cautioning that '[w]e ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath this law' .49 An important implication of this is that the Rule of Law may remain just even when the legal rules are not.
At one point, Thompson implies that he would not subscribe to a more elaborate theory of the Rule of Law -one which demands that that legal rules be enacted prospectively and with notice to the affected population:
The uncodified English common law offered an alternative notation of law, in some ways more flexible and unprincipled -and therefore more pliant to the 'common sense' of the ruling class -in other ways more available as a medium through which social conflict could find expression, especially where the sense of 'natural justice' of the jury could make itself felt.' 50 This statement is inconsistent with an elaborate conception of the Rule of Law, which requires prospective laws and notice to the affected population because the common law determines legal rules only upon deciding a concrete dispute.
51 By its very nature, the common law is reactive. 186 court rulings may not put the public on adequate notice because common law rules tend to be highly fact-specific, and they evolve over time. Changes in the common law rarely are announced before the fact of some decision.
Another reason for supposing that Thompson adopted a minimal conception of the Rule of Law in Whigs and Hunters is history itself. The minimal conception is the most historically defensible version of the Rule of Law, which limited arbitrary power long before constitutional and democratic institutions began displacing absolute monarchy and aristocracy throughout Europe. As the French political theorist Blandine Kriegel has written, '[t]he first states under the rule of law gave neither power to the people nor political liberty to the citizen. They were neither democratic nor liberal.' 52 The Rule of Law can be said to have arisen as soon as any king's discretion was first constrained by law. So, for example, the Mosaic Code constituted an imposition of the Rule of Law, restricting King Solomon's discretion, nearly a thousand years before the common era. Legal and religious limitations distinguished the Jewish kingdoms of 1025 to 587 BC from absolutist states, such as Egypt or China, whose rulers had discretion without limit. 54 Historians, including some of Thompson's critics, forget just how significant was the evolution from truly absolute monarchy to monarchy limited (however little in the beginning) by law.
Thompson appears to have understood the historical basis of the Rule of Law concept, though he did not discuss it at any length. In Whigs and Hunters he refers to the decline of royal prerogative in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the constitutional battle between the Crown and Jacobite printers in late eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century England. 55 Those who would tie-up the Rule of Law with democratic institutions, certain legal processes, or the morality of the legal rules themselves are left to explain the constraints that law placed on power and privilege prior to the democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth century.
There is some evidence, however, from one of Thompson If I have argued elsewhere that the rule of law is an 'unqualified human good' I have done so as a historian and a materialist. The rule of law, in this sense, must always be historically, culturally, and, in general, nationally specific. It concerns the conduct of social life, and the regulation of conflicts, according to rules of law which are exactly defined and have palpable and material evidences -which rules attain towards consensual assent and are subject to interrogation and reform. In 'State of the Nation', Thompson appears to tie in the Rule of Law with democratic institutions, particularly in his requirement of 'consensual assent' to legal rules. But this may be deceptive. As a 'historian in the Marxist tradition', who believed that law always remained in part a sham because of persistent class inequalities, 57 the idea of complete consensual assent to the laws surely would have struck Thompson as absurd. Perhaps that his why he qualified his consensual assent requirement, requiring only that the law 'attain towards consensual assent'. Reading the sentence as a whole, it becomes evident that Thompson meant that for the Rule of Law to exist, the legal rules must be 'subject to interrogation and reform'; otherwise, the law could impose no real limitation on the discretion of the rulers. On this reading, there is no significant inconsistency between my interpretation of Thompson's defence of a minimal conception of the Rule of Law in Whigs and Hunters and his later explanation in 'The State of the Nation'.
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More troubling is Thompson's assertion in 'The State of the Nation' that legal rules must be 'exactly defined'. This is far more difficult (if not impossible) to reconcile with what he wrote about the Rule of Law in Whigs and Hunters, particularly what he wrote about the common law as an institution. If legal rules must be 'exactly defined' for the Rule of Law to exist, then no common law country could be deemed a Rule-of-Law country because common law rules are never precisely defined but evolve from case to case. However, as I have argued in a very different context, if there are any Rule-of-Law states in the world, the common law countries of England, the United States of America, Australia, and Canada, surely are among them. 59 Thompson himself clearly thought England to be a Finally, if the Rule of Law is truly an 'unqualified' good (and Thompson uses that precise term twice in the final pages of Whigs and Hunters), 6 1 then how can it also be 'historically, culturally and, in general, nationally specific' as Thompson suggests in 'The State of the Nation'? The Rule of Law must possess some sine qua non that is not historically, culturally, and nationally specific; otherwise, how could historically, culturally, and nationally disimilar states be commonly referred to as Rule of Law states? That sine qua non for Thompson appears, again, to be the effective limitation of ruling power. Any society whose rulers possess unlimited discretion cannot be said to be governed by the Rule of Law. There are, however, various ways of effectively limiting power. Thompson's reference in 'The State of the Nation' to the historical, cultural, and national specificity of the Rule of Law may simply refer to the various ways in which a Rule of Law (that is, effective limitations on power) can be implemented. A given Ruleof-Law state may take on more or fewer of the trappings associated with a maximal Rule-of-Law concept -specified legal processes, an independent judiciary, more or less popular governance. But whatever the means chosen, a state must effectively limit the power of its rulers to be considered a Ruleof-Law state at all.
In this section, I have suggested that Thompson articulated a defence of the Rule of Law that, although not intended to constitute a fully fledged theory, supports a certain minimal conception of the Rule of Law. That conception boils down to this: the Rule of Law is an 'unqualified good' to the extent it (actually) limits ruling powers by requiring equal application of the legal rules to rich and poor, the powerful and powerless. The Rule of Law is by no means sufficient to ensure just legal rules or a just society in general, but it is a necessary condition in that its opposite -unbridled power -ensures injustice. 
Morton Horwitz on Thompson's 'conservatism'
The esteemed American legal historian Morton Horwitz takes issue with Thompson' s claim that the Rule of Law is an 'unqualified human good' because, he argues, it is a 'conservative doctrine' that actually impedes 'the pursuit of substantive justice.' 62 Horwitz does not dispute the fact that the law constrains power but, he insists, 'it also prevents power's benevolent exercise'. The law creates a formal equality that 'promotes substantive inequality' by fostering 'a consciousness that radically separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from outcomes'. 6 3 It promotes 'procedural justice that "enables the shrewd, the calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own advantage".
'64 Consequently, he cannot understand 'how a Man of the Left can describe the rule of law as "an unqualified human good".' 65 Horwitz can only suppose that creeping, middle-age conservatism had affected Thompson's judgment. 
Adrian Merritt on Thompson as a failed Marxist
Adrian Merritt proffers a more sustained critique of Thompson's 'apologia' for the Rule of Law.
6 7 She disputes Thompson's contention that the law can be seen 'simply in terms of its own logic, rules and procedures -that is, simply as law'. It may hold together as a 'logical intellectual construct', Merritt argues, but its logic is 'the logic of class formation'. 68 She accuses Thompson of positing 'straw men', labeled 'Marxist structuralists', who do not actually exist. No one who believes that law is class-based and ideological would deny Thompson's assertion that the law must be made to appear just and even for the rulers to legitimize the legal rules that serve their interests. The real structuralist critique, Merritt argues, peers behind the screen of the law's formal equality to reveal its inevitable class-based content. 69 Merritt further points to 'an underlying error' in Thompson's assertion that the Rule of Law imposes real constraints on ruling power. Even if the law constrains power -even if the legal rules themselves are most often just -that would 'not lessen its class nature.' 70 No matter what, Merritt argues, the law is inherently an instrument of class rule; and it cannot be separated from the ideology of the socio-economic system in place:
Law which reflected and supported the ideology of the feudal system gave way to a law which entrenched the ideology of a capitalist one. The struggles which Thompson talked of are part of that realignment. They are not something apart -representing unsullied ideas of justice and equity; they represented ideas of justice and equity refracted through class ideas.
7
Indeed, Thompson's assertion that the law can be just and serve the interests of the poor as well as the rich does not challenge the real Marxist structuralist critique, according to Merritt, but is in fact central to it. 72 The whole point of the law is to legitimize the assertion of power in the eyes of those who are disenfranchised and dispossessed. By throwing them morsels of legal victories every now and again, they may be molified by the law's formal equality. Meanwhile, the legal system continues operating for the overall benefit of 'the capitalist system, and therefore of modem imperialism.' 73 Interestingly, Merritt does not 'deny or belittle the comparative value of the rule of law vis-t-vis certain arbitrary power': But I do not think much is gained by taking time enthusing about it. Moreover I have been struck over the years by the political colour of the people who have 'gone on' about it, and by the selectivity of the abuses about which they complain. It is disappointing to find someone of Thompson's past experiences and allegiances lending support to such people. 74 Not only is Thompson lending support to the enemy, according to Merritt, he has actually joined them. He has become an 'apologist' for the Rule of Law and the capitalist system that underlies it. 'The nub seems to be be that Thompson 
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obstructs efforts to contest 'the legal form and its values'. In espousing the Rule of Law, Merritt suggests, Thompson is obligated to obey the laws whatever their contents.7
Bob Fine on Thompson as a 'dissenting kind of Marxist'
Thompson's most thoughtful critic on the issue of the Rule of Law may be Bob Fine, who has written extensively on the subject in two works published a decade apart. In his 1984 book, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 78 Fine devotes twenty pages to an 'appreciation' and 'critique' of Thompson's conception and espousal of the Rule of Law. Fine appreciates Thompson's resurrection of 'the liberal ideal of the rule of law in' in opposition to 'the poverty of present-day conservatism', according to which 'the 'rule of law' means an unconditional obligation to obey the state's laws', however draconian or unjust. 79 More surprisingly, he also praises Thompson for revealing 'the shortcomings of a Marxism which either reduces law to class dictatorship or elevates the state as a whole as a human good' . Fine discerns 'inherent contradictions' in Thompson's conception of the Rule of Law and offers an extensive 'Marxist critique' of it. In the first place, the Rule of Law need not be characterized as 'an unqualified human good' for one to recognize that it is superior to bald authoritarianism. Fine notes that Thompson does not similarly elevate bourgeois democracy, although it too is unquestionably superior to authoritarianism. So what is it that makes the Rule of Law not just a good but an 'unqualified' good?
The contradiction in Thompson's analysis stems from his exclusive focus on the law's capacity to limit arbitrary power. Fine has no problem with the assertion that law limits power, but, he points out, other institutions in society serve the'ane function of limiting power. Democratic elections, for example, limit power by subjecting rulers to removal from office. Moreover, the law does not just limit power but serves in various ways to enhance the power of the ruling class. By neglecting the law's largely political and economic functions in his assessment of the Rule of Law, Thompson commits the very kind of essentialist-reductionist error for which he criticizes the 'vulgar Marxist' conception of law.
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This is not to say that Thompson neglects the law's utility as an instrument of power. Fine rightly notes that Thompson condemnations of unjust laws and the corrupting influence of capital on the legal system. There is no necessary contradiction in this, however, because Thompson, on Fine's interpretation, views the instrumental use of law as the corruption of its essential function, which is to support the liberty of the people against arbitrary power. 8 4 But, Fine argues, this hardly constitutes a sufficient argument that the 'principle institutions of the liberal bourgeois stateparliament, jury trial, "independent judiciary", "impartial" police, etc. -are not only preferable to authoritarianism but are the last word in a free society'. 85 Fine challenges not only the theoretical basis of Thompson's Rule of Law conception but its historical basis as well. Specifically, Fine claims that '[ilt is an oversimplification -and ultimately wrong -' for Thompson to reduce all the eighteenth-century struggles described in Whigs and Hunters to 'a conflict between traditional use-rights and legally enforced private property rights' 86 In the first place, it was not only a dispute between peasants and craftspeople on the one hand, asserting their traditional use rights, and the gentry on the other, asserting outright ownership. The rebellion crossed class boundaries to include small gentry, 'capitalist farmers', and merchants, whose own property rights were abrogated in favor of the 'large gentry landowners'.
7 Indeed, 'middling men' were 'among the foremost in protest against these laws as an 'unconstitutional oppression'. 88 Moreover, it is not clear, according to Fine, that the hunters were merely trying to defend traditional use rights, as opposed to asserting 'absolute private property' rights of their own. 89 All of this seems to cut against Thompson's claim that the rebellion constituted a "plebian' activity based on the defence of an 'older moral economy '.90 Assuming (for the moment) Fine's historical criticisms are accurate, what caused Thompson to gloss over historical facts that seemed to refute his ideal Rule of Law? Fine suggests that Thompson was affected by 'a romanticism which sees in pre-bourgeois property relations a "human" state of affairs which the mass of the people wish to hold on to, and which sees the development of capitalist property an unmitigated evil which the mass of the people more or less consciously resist. 93 The myth was based on a natural law theory of property -'rooted in privilege, inequality, dependence, obligation and immutable law' -which could not be married with Thompson 1°° Antinomianism opposed the spirit of faith and love to the spirit of reason, which underlies the 'moral law'. 11 From Fine's perspective, antinomianism is a defective tradition, and Thompson Thompson' s prediction that the law would always be a necessary institution for any complex society): that legal limitations on arbitrary authority are always and everywhere a good thing.
Response to Horwitz
Morton Horwitz's criticism of Thompson's espousal of the Rule of Law rests on the erroneous supposition that the Rule of Law can only be a conservative doctrine, which 'impedes the pursuit of substantive justice'."°4 Certainly, Thompson's Rule of Law concept was no such impediment to substantive justice. It was, in fact, little (if anything) more than the effective limitation of arbitrary power. As such, it could neither impede nor ensure the pursuit of substantive justice. It was, rather, neutral as to the substantive justness of legal rules.
5
That this was Thompson's view is clear, once again, from his many assertions distinguishing between the Rule of Law and the legal rules, which often are unjust. Thompson makes this clear not only in Whigs and Hunters' 0 6 but in several of his later works. In Customs and Commons, for example, he states in no uncertain terms that the law in England during the enclosure era:
was employed as an instrument of agrarian capitalism, furthering the 'reasons' of improvement. If it is pretended that the law was impartial, deriving its rules from its own self-extrapolating logic, then we must reply that this pretence was class fraud.1 0 7
Thompson evidently felt that he could condemn the law for perpetrating class fraud while maintaining a commitment to the Rule of Law, which 103 id., p. 211. 
Nevertheless, Horwitz claims that any adherence to the Rule of Law (whatever its scope) contributes to false social consciousness that the legal system is just. And so Thompson's assertion of support for the Rule of Law nourishes the very conditions of injustice that Thompson repudiates throughout his works. But Thompson's writings strongly imply that false consciousness is neither a necessary nor a desirable attribute of his conception of law. In Whigs and Hunters he asserts that he is 'not starryeyed' about the law; to the contrary, he insists on 'expos[ing] the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath this law'. 10 9 Moreover, he claims, '[ilf the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegemony'.' 10 Thompson obviously gave his readers more credit than Horwitz would allow for their abilities to distinguish between the law's capacity for limiting arbitrary power and power's capacity for manipulating law. Moreover, if society is sometimes deceived into believing that the legal system as a whole is just when it is not, is that a consequence of believing in unqualified human good'. There is no contradiction in this, however, because there may be (and Thompson certainly thought there were) other politicaleconomic systems preferable to bourgeois democracy. The fact that bourgeois democracy is superior to authoritarianism makes it at best a qualified human good. What makes the Rule of Law an unqualified human good for Thompson is the lack of any available substitute mechanism for limiting arbitrary power in complex societies.
Of course the law is not the only institution that limits arbitrary power. Fine correctly points out that democratic elections serve a similar function. Why, then, does Thompson not claim that democracy is 'an unqualified human good'? It's a fair question, but it has no bearing on the warrant for Thompson's assertions about the Rule of Law. Whether the Rule of Law is 'an unqualified human good' is independent of whether democratic elections are an unqualified human good, unless democratic elections and the Rule of Law are prerequisites for one another. But, as already noted, Thompson maintained, and history demonstrates, that they are not.
The final 'contradiction' Fine purports to discover in Thompson's assessment of the Rule of Law is that it amounts to the very kind of essentialist reductionism for which Thompson repudiates Marxiststructuralist accounts of law. This claim would be true if Thompson's espousal of the Rule of Law caused him to neglect the law's political and economic functions in society, which often turn out to be unjust. But it did not. Contrary to Fine's assertion, Thompson's conception of the Rule of Law did not entail the proposition that other 'liberal bourgeois' institutions, such as parliament, jury trials, an independent judiciary, and an impartial police force, were 'the last word in a free society'. 1 22 True, Thompson preferred these institutions to those of authoritarianism -in particular, he believed that the jury system was crucial for the preservation of democracy, whatever society's economic basis 1 23 -but they were not entailed by his commitment to a minimal conception of the Rule of Law (for reasons set out earlier).
Historically, the Rule of Law (as Thompson apparently understood it) existed, to greater or lesser extents, in states without parliaments, jury trials, or independent judiciaries. France's ancien rrgime, for example, evolved from a patrimonial state to approximate (at least) a Rule of Law state of regulated sovereign power, although it remained exceedingly centralized and undemocratic. 124 Surely one can appreciate this historical evolution without acquiescing in the political and economic institutions of absolutist France. 
199
Fine's arguments about the role of small landowners and yeoman farmers in the rebellions against enclosure laws are quite sound, but they in no way undermine Thompson's claims about the Rule of Law. In fact, Thompson expressly recognized that the rebellion crossed class lines, and that it involved not a pure conflict between use rights and ownership claims but a conflict between differing perceptions of (absolute) property rights. 125 Fine may be right that this conflicts with Thompson's general portrayal of the rebellion as a 'plebian' activity based on the defence of an 'older moral economy'. 1 26 But what implication is there in this for Thompson's conception of the Rule of Law as a restraint on arbitrary power? It is difficult to perceive a connection.
Fine suggests that Thompson's notion of property, which informed his mythic account of the legal and constitutional rights of free-born Englishmen, necessarily conflicted with his view of the Rule of Law. 127 Thompson, Fine claims, reviled the concept of private property while elevating the Rule of Law; but Thompson's own history demonstrated that property and law arose together. So, how could he effectively separate the two? Thompson was able to separate the two because he did not revile all private property rights as Fine suggests. As previously noted, 128 Thompson (quite properly) understood the dispute between Whigs and hunters as a contest over whose version of property rights would prevail. Whenever they could afford it, the hunters hired lawyers to fight for their legal rights, just as small copyholders and the wealthiest Whigs did. 129 They held no romantic illusions about themselves; they were simply fighting for (what they perceived to be) their own. They were attemptin to use the law, in Marx's words, to expropriate the expropriators.l13 Which is what makes the law so valuable from Thompson's perspective: it provides a forum in which right and power can be contested. For this reason (among others), the law always is preferable to unbridled authoritarianism, against which the ruled simply have no chance.
Thompson surely would deny Fine's claims that his elevation of the Rule of Law 'expresses the very fetish of law as a force remote from productive relations', which necessarily excludes 'a Marxist critique' of law. 13 1 These claims stem from a conflation of the Rule of Law with the legal rules, which Thompson took pains to avoid. The legal rules may be strongly influenced -even determined -by productive relations. As Thompson put it, the law may be just a 'sham'. But that does not negate the universal value of the Rule of Law as a constraint on arbitrary power. Nor does his belief in the Rule of Law prevent Thompson Laws are in no way repressive measures against freedom, any more than the law of gravity is a repressive measure against motion, because while, as the law of gravitation, it governs the eternal motions of the celestial bodies, as the law of falling it kills me if I violate it and want to dance in the air. Laws are rather the positive, clear, universal norms in which freedom has acquired an impersonal, theoretical existence independent of the arbitrariness of the individual. A statute-book is a people's bible of freedom. Marx later abandoned this liberal-democratic view of law; at least he failed to reconcile it with the more instrumental view of law he articulated in later works.
13 7 No scholar, so far as I am aware, has ever asserted that Marx's claims in Debates on the Freedom of the Press excluded a Marxian critique of law, reified capitalist democracy, or committed the author to acquiesce in all laws, however unjust.
In the final analysis, if Thompson is right (against Marxist utopianism) that the law is a necessary institution for any complex society, then he must also be right that the Rule of Law is 'an unqualified human good'. Thompson 
